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INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The Council of the Socialist International met 
in Brussels on 14- - 16 December, 1951» for the first 
time since its institution at the First Congress in 
Frankfort-on-the-Main this summer. Morgan Phillips was 
in the Chair. The Conference was attended by 41 delegates 
representing 21 Parties affiliated to the Socialist 
International and the International Union of Socialist 
Youth.
The Conference reviewed the international situation 
and discussed in particular the problems of European 
unity, European army, and the economic and social 
implications of rearmament. A resolution incorporâting 
the agreed views of the Conference was adopted. We 
publish in this issue the text of this resolution and 
also a number of contributions to the debate on these 
problems, as well as the report submitted to the Council
Another subject discussed by the Conference was a 
World Plan for Mutual Aid, It was introduced by 
Morgan Phillips, whose speech we also reproduce.
The Conference set up a drafting commission, 
composed of representatives of the Socialist Parties 
of Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and 
India, to prepare a statement of a Socialist policy 
for the under-developed countries of the world.
It endorsed the suggestion of the British Labour 
Party to create a fund for the promotion of the Socialist 
movements in the under-developed areas.
It accepted the application for membership of the 
New Zealand Labour Party and will recommend to the next 
Congress its admission as member of the Socialist 
International,
The Conference considered the recent split in the 
Social Democratic Party of Japan and sent a message to 
both groups (published below).
It agreed to organise an International Socialist 
Seminar to give younger representatives of the movement 
an opportunity to acquire a better knowledge and under­
standing of international problems.
The Conference commemorated the tenth anniversary 
of the death at the hands of Stalin?s executioners of 
Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter, prominent members of
the Socialist International and leaders of the Jewish 
Bund.
by the Study Group on European unity.
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RESOLUTION ON ACTION FOR PEACE
The present state of international tension is largely 
the consequence of the aggressive policy of totalitarian 
Communism,
The Soviet leaders proclaim their desire for peace. 
They can prove it now s
V
- By coming rapidly to a peaceful settlement in Korea,
- By agreeing to the holding of free elections 
throughout Germany, under properly organised international 
supervision,
- By signing the Austrian Peace Treaty,
- By putting an end to the war of nerves against 
Yugoslavia.
There are other problems which must also be solved 
if peace is to be assured. They are ?
- The strengthening of the authority of the U.N.Oo 
and of its action for peace throughout the world.
- The restoration of democratic systems, by means 
of free elections under international supervision in 
all the oppressed countries of Europe, the guarantee of 
trade union rights and the gradual extension of democracy 
throughout the world.
- The settlement of conflicts between the Western 
nations and the Asiatic and African peoples, by 
negotiation and not by force.
- The application of a World Plan for Mutual Aid 
to under-developed areas.
Defence of Democracy
1. The free world faces two threats § the threat of 
aggression .and the threat of economic crises which
would leave it at the mercy of an aggressor.
2. It is the duty of free peoples to ensure their security 
by strengthening their means of defence.
3. From the need to defend ourselves there follows 
automaticoJ-ly the requirement that rearmament shall
be accompanied by a drive for increased production, 
capable of ensuring at the present tine a better standard 
of life for all peoples.
4. The working classes must not be asked to bear the 
greater part of the burden of rearmament. These
burdens must be equitably distributed between nations 
and between the classes of each nation.
5. It is not the function of chiefs of staff to influence 
political decisions ; the civil power alone is
responsible for these.
6 . The cause of peace is inseparable from that of liberty. 
The existence of fascist régimes constitutes a danger
to the solidarity and the effective co-operation between 
the democracies. The democracies cannot therefore seek 
to defend peace and liberty by allying themselves in any 
way with Franco Spain or, in the Far East, with 
Chiang Kai Cliek.
Supervision and Limitation of Armaments
Peace will be stabilised only when the Big Powers 
accept international supervision of all types of armanent, 
with the object of progressively reducing them.
Relations between .East and West
The isolation imposed by Soviet leaders upon the 
countries of the East and the obstacles to trade bet ween 
East and West contribute to the creation of a threat to
peace. Trade other than in war materials should not be 
hampered.
Return to Peace Economy
The cessation or the reduction of armament 
production can provoke a slump of catastrophic proportions 
if steps are not taken, in advance, to reconvert armament 
industries. In the absence of any reconversion plan, 
no permanent decrease of tension is posedble and the 
prospects of peace are accordingly weakened. General 
measures to prepare the return of a peace-time economy 
are therefore urgently necessary.
European Army
The International believes that in defence, as in 
all aspects of policy, equality of sacrifice must be 
assured, both within each nation and between the nations. 
But countries which do not enjoy equality of rights cannot 
be expected to play their full part in common defence.
American help and parti 
the defence of Europe which 
devastation of the last war.
is essential to 
weakened by the
The International believes it to be 
condition of peace that the whole of the 
be defended.
an essential 
free continent
It believes that collective security would be 
effectively strengthened by the creation of a truly 
European Army, with which all free countries could be 
associated from the first moment.
THE SPLIT III THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OP JAPAN
The Council of the Socialist International considered 
the split in the Social Democratic Party of Japan and instructed 
the Chairman and the Secretary of the Socialist International to 
convey the following appeal to both Socialist groups in Japan:
To Tetsu Katayama, Supreme Advisor,
I.iosaburo Suzuki, Chairman,
Inejiro Asanurna, Secretary-General,
The Japan Social Democratic Party,
Tokyo.
Dear Comrades,
The Council of the Socialist International,assembled 
in Brussels, has received with deep regret the report of the rift 
in the Social Democratic Party of Japan.
The Council does not, of course, wish to express its 
opinion on the attitude of either of the opposing wings in the Party
However, it desires to appeal most urgently to the 
leaders and supporters of both sides to refrain from taking any step 
^that might imperil the unity of the Socialist movement of your coun­
try.
A split in your Party and the formation of two rival 
Socialist parties would, believe us, be a major disaster for Japa­
nese Socialism.
It is our well-considered opinion, derived from so 
many errors and failures in the history of international Socialism, 
that no controversial issue - however serious it may appear - can 
possibly justify the harm that the split in a Socialist Party must 
inevitably do. If a major Socialist Party in a great country is 
torn assunder, its repercussions are felt throughout the interna­
tional Socialist movement.
The Social Democratic Party of Japan was well on the 
way to becoming a major Party of Asia and, indeed, of the Socialist 
International. It polled more than 7>300,000 votes in the elections 
for the House of Councillors in 1950, and it has steadily improved 
% ts relations with the trade unions and the peasantsT organisations. 
We had cherished the hope that, in a not too distant future, your 
Party would be called upon to shape the destiny of Japan and would 
transform Asia, in co-operation with the rising Socialist Parties 
of India, Burma, and Indonesia, into a Social Democratic stronghold.
A split in your Party would seriously imperil this 
promising development.
Therefore, we appeal to you, in the fraternal spirit 
of international Socialism, to resolve the dissension in your Party 
and to re-establish its unity on the firm basis of Socialist soli­
darity.
On behalf of the Council of the Socialist International 
With fraternal greetings,
Yours sincerely,
MORGAN PHILLIPS, 
Chairman.
JULIUS BRAUNTHAL, 
Secretary.
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THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
FOUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEBATE
Denis Healey (Secretary of the International Department
The British Labour Party has often been subjected 
to cogent criticisns from its Continental Socialist 
friends because of the foreign policy it pursued during 
the six years of Labour Government. Recently, this 
criticism has flared up with renewed strength. Whilst 
it is admitted that our home policy deserves much praise, 
our international policy is found wholly deficient. Our 
Party is used to such sweeping statements, and there is 
no point in being angry about it. But I should like to 
ask whether the memories of the Europeans are really so 
short that they have forgotten the many vital facts in 
our record which are milestones of international 
development ?
There can be no doubt, in my view, that it is 
largely due to the British Labour Party that there is 
now a chance of visualising life in the next fifty years 
without another world war.
It was Ernest Bevin who, with foresight and patience, 
started the closer collaboration of the European countries. 
He laid the basis for this collaboration through the 
Treaty of Dunkirk and the Brussels Pact. It was he who, 
in 1948, took steps towards merging Western European 
union into the larger Atlantic community, which is now 
recognised by us all as essential for the defence of 
the West.
In 194-5/48, when our own difficulties were greatest, 
we gave £1,000 million in goods and services to Europe, 
thereby sacrificing a greatly needed improvement in our 
standard of living.
The Labour Government has been the only Government 
of a white nation which succeeded in winning genuine 
friends in Asia after the war.
Taking into account our policy in Asia and Africa - 
a policy that is helping to change the face of these 
two vast Continents - I do not hesitate to say that the 
Labour Government’s foreign policy lias been the best we 
have had in Britain for a hundred years, and that it 
has been directed by Socialist convictions.
I should like to present an analysis of the present 
realities of the world situation, hoping that this will 
explain why Britain’s policy is different from what our 
Continental friends wish it to be.
A few words first on the question of the danger of 
war and Russian policy. It has been said - and the same: 
argument is also used by some members of the British Labour 
Party - that the superior potential industrial strength of
of the British Labour Party) i
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the West is sufficient to deter Russian aggression.
But it is a fact that Soviet production of coal, steel 
and oil at present is higher than Germany’s was in 1939 
when Hitler started his war of conquest, and than Japan’s 
in 194-1 when she deliberately started a war against the 
United States and Britain and conquered half South-East 
Asia,
The argument about the deterring effect of the 
higher industrial potential was also exploded by the 
war in Korea, We may agree that the Russian rulers do 
not want a world war * but it is clear that they do not 
mind a small war if they can hope to get away with it 
and limit the field of military operations. In June 
1950 they took such a risk, and the war in Korea started.
In May 1951 the Soviet calculations that the war would be 
limited were proved right, for the Western powers refrained 
from carrying the war into China (or Russia) to hit at 
the sources from which Korean aggression was supported.
In fact, they decided not to use their potential 
industrial strength, and rather to fight with their 
hands tied, because they were anxious to avoid a general 
war. Limited aggression, such as the attack in Korea, 
cannot be deterred by potential strength unless there is 
a determination to use that strength in its entirety, 
without any fear of the risks involved - in other words, 
by MaoArthurism.
an
obtained control of its resources .e overall balance
of industrial strength would change radically. It would 
become almost equal and Russia would no longer need to 
f e ar that in the long run the war might result in her 
own defeat.
Today we are faced with the problem of preventing 
limited aggression. Because we had completely inadequate 
forces locally, the war in Korea started, and if we 
achieve a settlement in Korea it will not be based on 
our victory. Surely, we cannot afford to repeat this 
experience. Because peace in Europe was maintained, 
we are too easily inclined to forget that three million 
peor>le died .in Korea as a direct result of Soviet 
aggression. We must prevent similar gambles.
Another argument which is frequently used to prove 
that the potential strength of the West will deter 
Soviet aggression is that, in fact, there has been no 
Communist aggression in the past five years when the 
Western powers were much weaker than they are now. In 
reply to this argument, may I point out that Soviet 
policy has become more and more aggressive, from action 
in Persia in 1946 to the putsch in Prague in 1948, to 
the Berlin blocade in 1949 - whose defeat cost the 
Western powers £13 million - and the Korean war In 1950.
The reasons for this are fairly obvious. After 1945 > 
the Soviet Union was completely exhausted by the war, 
and it took her three years to recover from this 
exhaustion. It took another two years to complete the 
incorporation of the satellite States into the Russian orbit
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and to manufacture the atomic bomb. Thus, many factors 
which at first had a restraining effect on Russia have 
ceased to exist.
The greatest danger of war lies in Europe. In 
Yugoslavia, there is an acute threat of attack. Other 
danger spots are Greece and Turkey, Berlin, perhaps 
Finland. Until there is sufficient armed strength in 
Europe to deter aggression this danger will persist.
What is the military position in Europe today ?
There are 150 Soviet divisions - taking .the combined 
strength of Russia and her satellites. Of these 100 
night be available North of the Alps - 50 being detained 
by the Yugoslavs - to advance along the plain that extends 
between the Channel and Moscow, sometimes called the 
“Bowling Alley“. The Western powers last year disposed 
of 12 divisions, now perhaps 25. No Western military 
planner has ever estimated that less than 40 or 50 
divisions are required to hold an attack, if it comes, 
long enough to mobilise sufficient of the potential 
strength of the West for effective defence on the 
Continent.
The N.A.T.O. powers are behind schedule as regards re­
armament. It is not possible for the "Western Europeans, 
without some contribution from Western Germany, to build 
up the necessary minimum defence forces.
No Socialist wants the restoration of a German 
national army. The questions that arise are therefore s 
how to obtain a German defence contribution ; how to 
provide terns of equality that are acceptable to Germany ; 
how to create an integrated defence force.
The United States would like to see a German 
national army restored, but since the other nations are 
opposed to_this, she supports the idea of a Continental 
defence union which, she expects, will be dominated and 
led by Germany.
Most Western Europeans are unwilling to accept this, 
because they fear Germany and they insist on Britain*s 
participation ; the only exception are those politicians 
who ignore the danger of a rearmed Germany - like the 
Vichy it es did - and that peculiar Catholic wing who 
believes that Rome, and not Germany, will become dominant.
It became clear at Strasbourg that the combined 
opposition to M. Schuman’s policy is so strong that its 
success is extremely doubtful, if not impossible.
Some Germans favour a Continental union because they 
hope to dominate it, or' because they believe it is 
necessary^to prevent worse from happening, or because they, 
too, see in it a means of obtaining predominance for Rome. 
The bulk of the German people, however, would not accept 
Germany^ integration in a purely Continental union. They 
aim at attaining the status of a big power, and realise 
that policy is decided by N.A.T.O. where Germany is not 
represented. If Adenauer accepts Continental union without
%
'Germany having a controlling voice in. Washington, his 
policy will break down in Germany - if' not elsewhere.
Continental European Socialists demand, as an 
alternative, a Europe united under British leadership.
What is the British position ? In 194-5 Britain was 
confronted ith the ruins of her world-wide Empire and 
the power vacuum that it implied. Her main attempt at 
first was to maintain her manifold strategic commitments 
until the Americans were prepared to take over their share, 
Ernest Bevin ?s conception of foreign policy was to consider 
the whole world, not merely one part of it, and the next 
fifty years, not merely the next five.
In 1945 we had more commitments than power, and we 
had to try to redress that balance. Yet we accepted more 
responsibilities towards Europe than Britain lias ever 
shouldered before. We have six divisions - in peace 
time - on European soil. We are committed to a whole 
network of consultation .In Europe. We helped Europe 
c nsiderably in goods and services, stretching our 
resources to the utmost, I believe it is bad if represent­
atives of European countries who failed to fulfil their 
own commitments are foremost in their criticism of Britainfs 
performance.
Britain is the only responsible power with major 
obligations in Asia, with the exception of French 
commitments in Indochina which France is trying rapidly 
to liquidate.
Thus, whilst the United States want Europe united 
under German leadership, the Western Europeans desire a 
union under British leadership, but Britain has not the 
power to take over the responsibility involved in such 
a role.
The only solution of this problem, in my view, lies 
within the framework of N.A.T.O, where the United States 
share the burden. Whereas Britain wants to involve the 
United States more deeply in the future of Western Europe, 
the United States would prefer to liquidate her respons­
ibilities - to withdraw or at least considerably reduce 
her troops in, say, two or three years - «and she therefore 
favours a strong Europe under German leadership.
^In my opinion, it was a mistake for Britain to 
promise support - in the Washington Declaration - for a 
European army which she has always opposed, However, it 
is sometimes necessary in these negotiations to give a 
quid pro quo. We realise, however, that our «agreement to 
the European army will not end the accusations that Britain 
is dragging her feet. Because as soon as the European army
is. set up Britain will bo blamed for not participating in
it, although she has made this clear from the outset.
It is most unfortunate that the British Conservatives 
have given a completely inacourate impression of their 
intentions as regards European policy. This lias caused 
tremendous disappointment among many Europeans and made 
then more bitter towards Britain. Many Continental
Europeans have, in my view, accepted the proposal for 
a European army in the hope that the Conservatives 
would adopt a more positive attitude towards the Euro ean 
army and European federation,
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I should now like to deal with the relations between 
Europe and the United States.
The withdrawal of the United States from Europe 
would be fatal to world peace and to everything else 
we as democratic Socialists want to achieve. Our 
struggle for survival cannot be won without close 
strategic and economic integration with the United States. 
Nor can we improve conditions in the under-developed areas 
without close co-operation with the United States. Even 
the attainment of an annual rise of only 2 % in the 
standard of living in the under-developed countries 
demands an investment, by the Western nations, of 
£3*800 million a year. The main contribution to this 
must cone from the United States.
We cannot realise peace and plenty 'without the 
United States becoming firmly involved in Ehrox^ e, the 
Middle East, Asia and Africa. The most essential task, 
therefore, is to achieve this aim. How can it be done ?
It is certainly not a question of Socialist dogma, but 
of skillful diplomacy. And we shall not achieve our 
purpose unless we welcome and invite American xoarticipation 
and do our utmost to fulfil our commitments in this 
Atlantic co-operatioh..
As regards the share of the European contribution to 
Western rearmament, my personal view is that it was right 
to accept the targets determined in the first place, and 
make an effort to fulfil the obligations undertaken.
'This does not rule out, however, that at a later stage 
the difficulties which face the Suroioean nations in the 
carrying out of the rearmament programme are raised 
again and remedies sought within the Council of N.A.T.O,
Generally speaking, the difference between the 
Continental and the British viewiDoints can be expressed 
in this way 2 the former believes that the establishment 
of a united European power is necessary to make a success 
of N.A.T.O,, whilst the latter considers a European union 
undesirable before the United States are more firmly 
committed.
The control of German power is not possible within 
the Continental Eurox>ean framework. Only the United 
States can balance the scales. In fact, General Eisenhower 
when speaking about possible American withdrawal threatened 
European unity.
The nature of the Cold War is changing, and we must 
adjust our ideas to the changes which are taking place. 
After 19A3, when the Cold War started, Britain was the 
only firm point in the vacuum that existed between Russia 
and the Soviet Union., The Free World was then dominated 
by the Anglo-Saxon powers and Britain had a very great 
influence on United States x>olicy. She was largely
11
responsible for drawing America into Western co-operation.
This situation is rapidly coning to an end. Since 
the Korean war in particular, the Unite*! States thinks 
for herself - often, I suggest, not as intelligently as 
she did when British influence was greater - and is acutely 
conscious of the fact that she is supplying 90 % of the 
troops in Korea. This development has its fascination 
for the United States, but it is appalling to Europe.
There are other changes in the situation, Germany, 
Japan and China have been emerging with renewed strength 
from the power vacuum. Important powers in Asia and in 
the Middle East do not wish to take sides in the East- 
West conflict. With the emergence of a larger number of 
powerful nations, there are more possibilities of 
combination. We nay not welcome this change, but we 
have to take it into account.
As regards Germany, if the Socialists do not attain 
power in this country we must reckon with the possibility 
of a Gorman alliance with Russia, The desire for a united 
Germany and the recovery of bhe East German provinces lost 
to Poland may well act as a strong driving-force in this 
direction. We cannot rule out the possibility of a 
Continental union, dominated by Germany, dragging Western Europe 
into such a union with Russia,
There is little time left for a Western European 
initiative. The most essential thing is for the United 
States to become more closely involved in Europe, and we 
may have to pay a price for this. We cannot afford to 
indulge in dangerous dreams and impossible schemes for 
Europe. I am convinced that the establishment of a 
Continental community at this stage is dangerous, and that 
we should concentrate on inter-governmental co-operation 
within the framework of U.A.T.O,
It is cur duty as Socialists to look coldly at the 
facts. Wishful thinking and the fostering of prejudices 
will lead us nowhere. If a Third World War is to be 
prevented, we must frame our policies after frankly facing 
the fact.
Erich Ollenhauer (Vice-Chairman of the German Social 
_  - - Democratic Party and of the Socialist
International) §
The German Social Democratic Party has many times 
stated its attitude towards European unity and such projects 
as the Schuman Plan, It has explained the reasons why 
Germany’s situation is entirely different from that of 
France or the Benelux countries.
As a Cvonsequence of the war and the difficulties of 
the first post-war years, the position of Germany is far 
more unfavourable than that of the others. We can see no 
chance of German interests being properly taken into account 
by the High Authority of the Sc human Plan. This fear has not
been allayed by anything1 that has been said in the 
discussions that have taken place within the Socialist 
International. We have seen no proof of a genuine 
partnership being offered to Germany, and there are many 
facts to substantiate this impression.
On the subject of European defence, the point of 
view of the German Social Democrats has also been clearly 
stated at COMISCO conferences. Again, our objections to 
current plans have not been net, although I admit that 
the discussions held by the Socialist representatives 
at Strasbourg have been useful.
We are often accused of adopting an anti-European 
attitude because we reject the Schunan Plan and the 
European defence community. But this accusation is really 
wholly off the mark. Since its reconstitution in 1946, 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany has never left any 
doubt as to its belief that Germany belongs irrevocably 
to the West.
The German Social Democrats have always adopted a 
positive line on the need to defend Eree Europe, 
politically and militarily, against the Soviet threat.
We welcomed the fact that after 1946 the Western Pov/ers 
did not adopt a policy towards Russia on Munich lines. 
Nevertheless, it is sometimes unfortunate that military 
questions are so much in the foreground. Eor the Soviet 
Union is two-faced and the Soviet threat is twofold.
The danger of infiltration has been, and still is, as 
real as the.danger of open aggression. We must reckon 
with the continuation of Communist attempts at disruption 
from within*
For this reason full employment and social security 
are^vital points in Western defence. They are, of course, 
desirable for their own sake, but their importance as 
part of our peace policy is equally great.
The^social effects of rearmament present us with 
very ^ serious problems. The burden imposed upon the 
working masses by rearmament will not be easy to carry.
And the question arises as to how long we shall be able 
to boar these costs of an armed peace. It is possible 
that the Russians are consciously out to create anxiety 
and make trouble so as to force the West into a tremendous 
rearmament programme with all the social, psychological 
and political implications that are its inevitable 
consequence. They may, indeed, calculate that in this way 
they will eventually reap better results at less cost to 
themselves than by war.
It is unfortunately true that the main 'trend in 
Western Europe is towards more reactionary governments.
This is particularly dangerous because the reactionaries 
favour a purely negative anti-Bolshevist policy. If this 
trend continues - and the growing rapprochement with Franco 
Spain is an indication that it will - the threat to the 
maintenance of democracy will grow also. It may become 
a danger as fatal to our survival as Bolshevist aggression.
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It is important for us to follow the development 
in the United States closely. I agree with Denis 
Healey that we must try to prevent the United States 
from beooming isolationist. One means to achieve this 
is greater unity in Europe. But we should not allow 
ourselves to be induced by the present dangers and 
tensions to support proposals that are, in fact, not 
solutions.
Go-operation between the Democracies of Western 
Europe is a difficult and slow process. But it is 
vital that it should include all nations. We have often 
stated in COMISGO that comprehensive Western European 
co-operation is imperative for Socialists. We are in 
danger of abandoning this principle now.
In my opinion, the Continental community of the 
six nations is not a real and practicable project for 
Socialists. I am convinced that the Benelux countries - 
once they see that Britain does not come into the union - 
will not join it either. This would leave France,
Germany and Italy - in other words, a Conservative, 
Clerical, anti-Communist bloc. It would mean a 
splitting up of Europe v/ith fatal consequences.
We the German Social Democrats ore not prepared 
to follow this course, whereas Adenauer seems to be 
willing to follow it at almost any price.
There is another complication. It is very difficult 
for Western Germany to join, a Continental Union before 
the unification of Germany, which we refuse to consider 
impossible, has been brought about. It might mean 
a permanently split Germany. And this would be fatal 
not only for Germany but for Europe as a whole.
In;1953:at’the latest, perhaps earlier, we shall 
have new elections in Germany. Then the end of the 
present Adenauer policy will come. If the Government of 
Dr. Adenauer now decides to bring Western Germany into 
a Continental political union, the majority of the 
population will not be behind him.
As regards the relations between the Soviet Union 
and the Western powers, we believe it is important that 
contact be maintained. It may be impossible ^ to arrange 
a Four-Power Conference and if it does meet it may not 
reach any conclusions. Nevertheless, attempts at 
discussion should not stop.
That is why we in Germany supported a policy of 
responding to the recent initiative of Grotewohl. The 
Social' Democrats pursued the correct German and European 
policy by forcing the Russians to say what they wanted.
It is true, the Russians refused to give a clear answer, 
but at least they were pushed into the defensive.
The problem of German unity will remain priority 
on our agenda. We shall follow up any move that promises 
the possibility, however slight, of success In this 
sphere,
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Although we reject a Continental European Union, 
we do not stand aloof from concrete steps promising a 
genuine advance in European co-operation. We have 
welcomed the Marshall Plan, and we co-operate in the 
Council of Europe.
But if Germany is taken into a Continental Union 
limited to three Powers, and as a consequence the division 
imposed by the Iron Curtain becomes more rigid, we Gorman 
Socialists shall not accept any responsibility for this.
A word about German neutrality. It may be that
agreement on à.neutral Germany might offer a chance
of reaching a settlement with the Russians. But we do
not believe that German neutrality is practicable. And
the German Social Democrats are opposed to any such scheme.
*
For what would happen ? The military forces of the 
United States would be withdrawn beyond the Atlantic and 
those of Great Britain beyond the Channel, while the 
armoured divisions of Soviet Russia, and Communist Poland 
and Czechoslovakia would remain close to the German 
borders. The power vacuum created by the neutralisation 
of Germany would be infiltrated by the Communist Powers - 
an infiltration backed by their formidable military force.
I now come to the question of the German defence 
contribution. The German Social Democrats support the 
idea of such a contribution. We agree that Germany 
cannot claim rights only, but must at the sane time 
accept duties. We reject a policy of “without us“, and 
we are not a pacifist sect either.
But we are concerned about the conditions and forms 
of the German defence contribution. Let me first of all 
put a point of principle. If Germany is invited to join 
the European community because she is needed, then she 
must be granted a status of equality, not only in theory 
but in practice. Otherwise there will be no stable 
partnership,-
I beg of you to understand this point. The German 
youth today is fortunately no longer militaristic. The 
experiences of the last war have wiped out this sentiment. 
If we now appeal to the German youth to accept its share 
of the burden of Western European defence, it will 
respond to this appeal only if it is convinced that its 
own cause is at stake. It will feel that Western Europe*s 
cause and their own are one and the same if Germany is 
a member of Western Europe on equal terms.
Unfortunately, the Western Powers are trying to save 
rudiments of the occupation policies whilst talking about 
equal status for Germany. We Well understand that a 
long time is needed for the European nations to forget 
the crirjes of the Hitler régime. But if there is still 
such a strong fear of Germany and the other nations, in 
their concern for security, cannot offer tru^ equality 
to Germany, they should say so openly and bear the 
consequences.
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A compromise in this matter simply would not work. 
The attempt to build up a union on such a compromise
would be doomed to failure,
%
As regards the concrete present situation, the 
plans for a European army seem far from complete and 
definite.
The present, negotiations in Paris, which deal with 
technical and organisational questions, do not really 
touch the heart of the matter. The decisive issue is 
the political one, and all political questions are still 
open. In our Socialist group at Strasbourg we heard an 
interesting statement from Guy Mollet who said that he 
could not imagine that the French Parliament.would agree 
to France’s participation in a European defence'community 
if Britain were not a partner, too.
The Social Democratic Party of Germany is opposed 
to the revival of a German national army. But it is 
also against. Gorman contingents in a European army so 
long as Germany is not granted her share in the control 
of the policies which direct the use of this army.
This control lies in the hands of N.A.T.O., of which 
Germany is not a member.
If the Germans are prepared to provide soldiers 
willing*, to sacrifice their lives for European defence, 
then they must also be given the right to an 'equal voice 
in the political control of European defence.
We do not believe that the present plan for a 
European defence community will, in fact, strengthen 
Western European defence. Therefore, we shall oppose it 
in the German Parliament whatever happens.
To sun up, our aim must be to include all European 
nations in the European framework of co-operation. Our 
attitude to any concrete proposal for a European Union 
is that there must be equal rights and equal duties for 
all participants. To us, this seems the only possible 
truly European policy.
Albert Gazier (M.P., Member of the Exe.sutive of the French
~~ Socialist Party, former Minister of 
Information) s
The French Socialist Party, as is well-known, 
supports the Schuman and Pleven Plans.
As regards the Schuman Plan, we know the objections 
that have been raised against it by Socialists. Yet in 
our view it is the only concrete proposal that sets out 
to regulate on a European level some of the common 
economic problems of the various European countries.
There can be no progress towards Socialism without 
improved living standards, without an extension of 
production, without the abolition of trade barriers and of
*discriminations involved in the maintenance of economic 
frontiers. The Sc human Plan is an attempt to further 
those purposes.
At any rate, we do not believe that the method of 
capitalist cartels is preferable, and in the absence of 
public control the application of this method is 
inevitable.
It is extremely significant that the French 
adherents of industrial cartels form a solid front 
against the Schuman Plan, joining hands in this 
opposition with the Communists. Whereas Kurt Schumacher, 
on the one side, denounces the Schuman Plan as an 
instrument of French domination, its capitalist opponents 
on the French side attack it as a means of German 
domination.
We do not claim that the Schuman Plan is perfect. 
But since we reject a unification of Europe by force, 
the only available method is agreement involving some
compromise. Each partner must abandon certain points 
on which he feels strongly, to the advantage of others - 
this is the essence of negotiation and voluntary 
co-operation.
The French Socialists are in favour of trying every 
possible device to link Britain with the coal and steel 
pool envisaged under the Schuman Plan, even if Great 
Britain remains merely an observer.
We admit that the Schuman Plan is inadequate as an 
instrument of economic planning, but it may succeed in 
establishing a unified market for iron and coal, which 
would be a real achievement.
Secondly, as regards the European army, the French 
Socialists favour it in principle. But the shape and 
form in which the European army is at present emerging 
arouses a number of misgivings amongst Socialists, and 
the attitude taken by the various sections within the 
S.F.I.O. varies - but these are only differences of 
nuance, not of principle.
In my view, the Schuman 
the six countries at present 
fulfil a useful function. It 
certain economic problems on 
It is a different matter, on 
the defence project, which is 
for the same regional groupin 
Many French Socialists believ
Plan - even if limited to 
associated with it - may 
is possible to solve 
this limited regional level, 
the other hand, as far as 
being devised
g of nations, is concerned, 
e it to be rather unfortunate
that the Schuman Plan and the European army are limited 
to the same six nations. For the French Socialists are 
against a political union limited to these six .countries. 
They refuse to accept the separation of Britain from, the 
Continent which is involved in such a development.
Denis Healey*s statement as regards current views 
on the deterring effect of the industrial potential 
of the West are very valid. But if we agree that Western
potential superiority is not enough, it is the nore 
important that the available resources of the Western 
nations be properly co-ordinated so that their potency 
nay be increased.
Let us remember that in the East economic and 
political barriers are being removed - Russia sees to 
it that there is a unified market in Eastern Europe 
at her disposal. The West must reinforce its economic 
strength 5 it must develop a unified market, for economic 
as well as military reasons. This is necessary if we are 
to avoid war,
.Any settlement of the German problem which would 
see the Soviet troops withdraw behind the Eastern German 
frontiers and the Americans to their own country would 
create instability and anxiety. The United States must 
be induced to stay in Europe.
In considering a German defence contribution, it is 
rather important to examine whether any given contribution, 
in fact, strengthens Western defence or, perhaps, is more 
likely to weaken it.
We cannot agree to a German defence contribution 
that carries with it the development of a wholly autonomous 
Germany, able to pursue her own course in foreign affairs. 
Would not Germany then be inclined to build up her 
strength and seek to revise her frontiers ? The dangers 
involved in such a course would be too great.
It is therefore necessary to integrate Germany into 
a much larger unit, including the United Kingdom.
■ •
The question that arises here is 2 what about the 
supra-national authority which, according to the French 
view, is to exercise political control ?
We favour such a supra-national authority. But if 
this is too great a step, if Great Britain is not willing 
to reconsider her negative attitude on this matter, the 
French Socialists would not insist on this point and would 
be prepared to accept a different kind of authority and 
control.
To 011enhauer?s demand for equal rights for Germany 
within the international framework to be created, we say 
wyes',?. But there may be certain stages on the road to 
full eque.lity through which we must pass. For example, 
if at the outset it is impossible to include all the 
troops of the European, nations in the European army - 
because of present commitments in overseas countries, 
perhaps - then definite successive stages must be laid 
down for overcoming this inequality in due course.
It is the special duty of Socialists to insist on 
the economic and social consequences of our defence
effort being taken fully into account. Those who ignore 
these consequences, those who ignore the sacrifices the 
people are being asked to make for rearmament, will not
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be able to give the right kind of leadership at this 
difficult tine. Progressive taxation to share out the 
burden fairly within the nation must a major concern of 
the Socialists everywhere. Equally, they must demand 
that the richer countries make a comparatively larger 
contribution to defence than the poorer ones.
This is essential if the right climate, the essential 
conditions of a sound and stable attitude of the populatioi 
are to be created. This climate is needed to make a 
success of our defence efforts, and it is seriously 
disturbed by developments such as attempts to include 
Franco ®s armies in the European or the Atlantic forces.
If the belief is killed that it is democracy that is 
to be defended, the defence effort is bound to suffer.
The fight against Communism demands confidence in the 
justice of the cause which, is to be defended against 
attack.
We should declare, frankly, that the purpose of 
the defence is part of the defence itself. Only a firm
belief in this purpose can prevent despair, discouragement 
and make it nossibl© to avoid all wovocation.
Eventually, there must be negotiations between 
East and West. It is true that strength is needed if 
the West is to negotiate successfully with the Soviet 
Union. But it is also true that negotiations under the 
threat of force will not lead to good results and should 
be rejected.
Labour
Since the war in Korea started the questions 
concerning European unity are closely linked with 
general -world situation.
the
Our attitude to the Schuman Plan depends on the 
progress made with the creation of a European army $ 
and these problems cannot be se 
of the Atlantic community and t 
between Europe and the United States ; the Gorman problem 
too, is an intricate part of all these questions. The 
refusal of Britain and Scandinavia to participate in 
closer European integration is another vital factor 
in the picture.
I regret to state that GOMISOO and the Socialist 
International have failed to tackle these problems 
effectively. Too often have v/e evaded the real problems 
because this or that party disliked facing them. It is 
true that our conferences have helped us a great deal in 
becoming better acquainted with the standpoints held by 
the various Socialist parties but, unfortunately, this 
is not enough to bring about' positive results and
definite decisions.
Undoubtedly, there exists in our ranks not merely 
differences in nuance and emphasis but real differences 
of opinion.
Kurt Schumacher, for example, in a pamphlet entitled 
”A Winter of Decisions”, writes :
‘"Agreement to the Schuman Plan by the Federal 
Government... would mean agreement to subjection 
and permanent reparations which no dictate of 
the victors would have been able to impose.
The economic policy of the Allied occupation 
Powers is definitely directed towards the 
we a kening of Go rm an y .?"
And about the European army, Schumacher says this 2
""The tendency here, as in the case of the Schuman 
Plan, is to place an integrated Western Europe 
under French leadership, with Germany as the 
only country denied all the rights and possibil­
ities accorded all other participants.”
The views held by the French or Dutch Socialists on 
the Schuman and Pleven Plans are certainly the very 
opposite of the opinions expressed by the Chairman of 
the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Surely, one or 
the other view only can be correct, and a situation in 
which both views are adhered to within the Socialist 
International is, in the long run, intolerable.
European defence is not a technical-military problem 
at all, but a political problem.. The discussions in Paris 
regarding the size of the divisions and other technical 
details are only diverting attention from the real issues.
If it were only a question of military expertise, all 
N.A.T.O. countries would easily agree on every point.
The political issues involved in European defence 
are manifold. The fair distribution of European manpower, 
the sharing out of the financial burden, the standardisation 
and integration of the equipment - all these are important 
matters. But the most vital problem is that of the German 
contribution. In my view, we must face the consequence 
of asking Germany to make a defence contribution complete 
equality is the necessary consequence.
Erich Ollenhauer, at previous international Socialist 
conferences, has declared that the German Social Democratic 
Party recognises Germany^ obligation as regards Western 
European defence if she is accorded a status of equality 
in the Western European community. He expressed this 
view in these words s ”Uo rights without duties.”
The Dutch Labour Party agreed to this view long ago.
We need German help in Western defence, and we must grant 
her full equality.
To us as Socialists it should be a matter of course 
to agree to this demand for equality. We must open the 
way for Germany to membership of the United Hations and
the Atlantic Pact. But it is' Germany's inclusion in 
a European army that promises the best guarantees for 
controlling Germany and thus re-assuring her neighbours 
that her power will not be abused. The support this 
idea is gaining is an indication that this way promises 
success.
But time is short, and we should go ahead with 
the necessary measures bringing Germany into the 
European community first, and the Atlantic and United 
Nations communities later.
Moreover, the United States under Eisenhower's 
influence is now pressing for a European army, as was again 
made clear by the visit of American representatives to 
Strasbourg.
Responsible circles in the United States are asking 
themselves what course they are to take in the absence 
of a united Western Europe. There are only two courses 
open to them. The first if the creation of a national 
German army, the second withdrawal from Europe.
Both courses would be fatal for Europe and for 
us as Socialists.
Yet we hesitate to adopt the alternative open to 
us ; we are reluctant to embrace concrete projects for 
European integration.
The French Socialists make their agreement to the 
European army dependent upon British participation and, 
unfortunately, Churchill is as disappointing as Attlee 
on this subject. In France, there is a new wave of 
neutralism - though admittedly not in Socialist circles - 
that has undoubtedly been caused, at least to some extent, 
by Britainrs negative attitude towards European union.
The Continental Socialists are deeply disappointed 
by British foreign policy, and their great sympathy with 
the British Labour Party, their admiration for its achieve­
ments at home, only increases this disappointment. This 
summer at the Labour Party Conference at Scarborough,
1 talked with several British delegates and my impression 
then^was that they realised the danger connected with 
the increasing power of the United States. My hope at 
the time was that this would cause a change in British 
attitude towards European integration. It seems so 
obvious to me that we must strengthen Europe in order to 
meet this American danger.
At the Hamburg Conference of the European Movement, 
too, I seemed to notice changes in the attitude of the 
British Conservative Forty, and hopes were then aroused 
amongst the Continental representatives - only to be 
sadly disappointed when the Tories came to power.
The most essential point is that for the United 
States a strong Germany with a strong national army is 
the alternative to European union. America does not 
depend on Britain alone ; she can base her European policy 
upon Germany.
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Pine words declaring our determination to work for 
peace are not enough. In 1950, at the Plenary Assembly 
of the International Socialist Conference in Copenhagen, 
the Dutch delegation abstained from voting on the 
resolution on World Peace because, In our view, it lacked 
concrete contents. The masses in all the countries 
desire clear answers to the questions of the day.
Lack of clarity and decision on our part are to 
blame for some of the difficulties encountered by 
President Truman in his fight against the isolationists 
in America, If we are Incapable of establishing a united 
Western Europe, Taft may well be given a chance of 
victory in the forthcoming American elections.
Let us not deceive ourselves about our failure to 
act decisively on the European problems by an emphasis 
on Asia and Africa. It is important that we work out 
a policy for the under-developed areas, but it is not 
a substitute for a Socialist policy for Europe, or a 
Socialist policy for the Atlantic community. This 
view v/as also expressed by representatives of the United 
States trade unions at a recent meeting of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, who 
were most concerned about our r'escape into the Far East;i, 
The Socialist International must exert an influence on 
all the major international problems if it is to fulfil 
its proper function.
Perhaps it is not yet too late to find a common 
platform. We should ask the leading representatives of 
our affiliated parties to meet for a thorough examination 
of the international situation. In a number of countries 
the Socialists are no longer in the Government, Perhaps 
we can turn bad lack into good by utilising the greater 
freedom allowed by opposition to strengthen co-operation 
in the Socialist International.
It is tine we realise the seriousness of the inter­
national situation. True to the international idea of 
solidarity, we must carry out our historical mission.
xx
p
■
Adolf Scharf (.Chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party and
Vice-Chancellor of the Austrian Federal 
Republic) §
The most impressive part, in my view, of Denis 
Healey*s speech v/as his argument on the deterrent effect 
of the superior industrial potential of the West.
I believe that history has proved his thesis right.
An expanding power possessing military superiority is 
not^as a rule discouraged from aggression by its economic 
deficiencies. It may well hope to remedy these weaknesses 
by the conquests made possible by its military superiority.
Indeed, the most discouraging factor since 19A5 has 
been^precisely this danger from Soviet Russia. But the 
realisation of the dangers confronting us should cause us
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to unite more firmly in defence of our cause.
The geographical position of Austria is a strategic 
key position. A Russian array marching through our 
country would ho able.to reach the Rhine within 'two 
days. If this were to happen it would.no longer he a 
question of defending Europe on the Rhine. If Soviet 
troops advanced through the Po Valley, they would also 
reach their objective within 48 hours, and the Eastern 
Mediterranean would be closed to the West.
We in Austria feel 
'anxieties stirred up by 
national situation.
most acutely all the fears and 
every disturbance in the inter
We are convinced that the moral strength needed 
to endure present instabilities and uncertainties depends 
largely on the social conditions under which people live. 
Nevertheless, the future of freedom in the world and the 
survival of Socialism mean more than a struggle for 
improved living standards.
We know that the war against Paso ism demanded 
sacrifices, especially in Great Britain, but also on 
the Continent. The people then were willing to sacrifice 
many of their material interests for the sake of victory. 
Are we not in a similar position today ? In my view, we 
are living in a beleaguered fortress at present - but in 
our discussions we often seem, to forget this fact.
If we accept the analysis given by Denis Healey, 
we must concentrate our forces on our defence effort.
It may well be that it will be easier for the 
Russians to come to terms with the Conservative 
Government in Britain than with a Labour Government.
But even if some kind of armistice between East and West 
is attained, and even if it lasts for a fairly long tine, 
we shall still be facing a dangerous situation. Por the 
balance of forces will remain precarious. Moreover, the 
political initiative 'is passing over, more and more, to 
the Conservative forces. This would mean that we 
Socialists have missed our opportunity.
Hans Hedtoft (M.P., Chairman of the Danish Social Democratic
Party, former Prime Minister of Denmark) %
Prior to this Council meeting, the Scandinavian 
parties discussed the question of a common declaration
for Peace to be issued 
prepared a draft text, 
able to impress people 
though they were false 
dishonest. Therefore, 
our ideas to the people
by the Socialist International, 
The Communists have often been 
by their peace resolutions even 
and the intention behind them 
wre thought, we should try to put 
who are concerned about peace.
and
The views expressed by Koos Vorrink have made me 
rather reluctant to present our draft to the Council.
For it is phrased in more general terms than he would like
to see, and does not offer solutions to all the concrete 
problems which, in his view, should be decided by the 
Socialist Internationale
We Scandinavian Socialists have always been rather 
critical of too many resolutions, and we know that 
resolutions have a limited value. Nevertheless, it 
seems to us worthwhile to express the things on which 
we are all agreed, and we believe that we as an 
International should say something on peace in the 
present situation.
The Scandinavian parties, too, do not see eye to eye 
on all aspects of international policy. Yet they found 
that it was politically effective to present their common 
viewpoints on peace in the Manifesto published at the 
beginning of this year.
I would like to emphasise the fact that the text 
prepared by the Scandinavian parties is meant merely 
as a suggestion ; it lists the following points.
The aggressive policy of totalitarian Communism is 
the main cause of international tension today.
The Soviet Union proclaims her. desire for peace.
V/e suggest that she can and should prove it now by 
making possible a peaceful settlement in Korea ; by 
agreeing to the holding of free elections throughout 
Germany, under properly organised international supervision 
by signing the Austrian Peace Treaty ; by putting an end 
to the war of nerves against Yugoslavia.
The non-Communist nations must contribute towards 
the relaxation of world tension by combining firmness 
with willingness to negotiate. They must abandon any 
attempt to co-operate with Franco Spain and, in the Far 
Fast, with Chiang Kai -Shek.
They must seek to strengthen the United Nations, 
to make it world-wide and increase its authority.
Western European rearmament must be combined with 
a determined defence of economic and social standards, 
and with a fair distribution of the burden, both within 
the nations and between then.
In the conflicts between the Western States and the 
nationalist régimes or movements of Asia and Africa, 
every possible opportunity must be sought for negotiations, 
with a view to attain solutions that take the legitimate 
interests of both sides into account.
A long-term programme for a real stabilisation of 
peace and a fruitful co-operation between the nations must 
aim at the development of the United Nations as a real 
instrument of peace ; progressive disarmament under 
international control, in accordance with the size of 
population ; the restoration of democracy in the whole 
of Europe and its gradual extension to other parts of 
the world ; support by the richer nations of the economic
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development of the poorer nations,
I should like to add two comments to these 
proposals.
First, I believe it to be of great importance 
that we consider all the Asian problems not merely 
from the angle of the military defence of the West but 
in their entire social and political setting. That is 
why any support for Chiang Kai Shek is out of question.
Secondly, we should not agree to a complete 
strangling of trade between Eastern and Western Europe, 
Naturally, trade in war materials must be prohibited. 
But other trade should be allowed to continue.
x x
X
EUROPEAN UNITY
By M, van der Goes van haters, M.P, 
Rapporteur of the Study Group on European Unity
The Study Group considered at its recent meeting 
the Socialist tasks and perspectives arising from the 
Washington Declaration of the three Foreign Ministers 
of 14 September, 1951, According to this declaration, 
the United States, Britain and France seek the inclusion, 
on a^basis of equality, of a democratic Germany in a 
Continental European community that will form part of 
the Atlantic community. The second important point was 
the statement that Britain wishes to establish the 
closest possible links with the Continental European 
community in all stages of its development.
f
The political tasks confronting Socialists was 
formulated by Guy Mollet as follows % to seek to solve 
the key political problem of the moment by an entente - 
if only partial - in other words, the establishment of 
a Continental political community incorporating the 
plans for a European army and the "diplomatic pool'" ; 
to construct it in such a way as to make it possible 
to maintain close links with the United Kingdom and the 
rest of Europe, and to regroup- the present European 
organisms - Council of Europe and O.E.E.C,
There were divergent views, however, on the correct 
interpretation of the Washington Declaration, and 
accordingly on the policies to be adopted.
One view was that the stress placed on the 
"Continental Community" was no more than a manoeuvre, 
especially as regards the defence community which the 
signatories really wanted to see fail - in which case 
the Atlantic organisation would be the only possible link
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between the 'Western countries. Fears were also expressed 
lest the organisation of a European army, incorporating 
German contingents, might be followed by a withdrawal 
of American troops from Europe, It was suggested, on 
the other hand, that the abandonment of the European army 
and the failure of Continental collaboration would further 
the development of Atlantic collaboration in a much tighter 
form.
Another interpretation attributed to the Washington 
Declaration indicates precisely the opposite meaning. 
According to this view, Atlantic co-operation depended 
on the integration of Europe, on the creation of a close 
Continental community, consisting of the six Schuman Plan 
countries, firmly associated with Great Britain and acting 
in close unison in the Council of Europe and O.E.E.C.
There was general agreement that no Socialist party 
could accept the idea of a large German national army as 
a means of Western defence and that the existence of 
N.A.To0,^alone - if it were possible for Germany to take 
part in it - was not an adequate guarantee against 
reactionary German adventures or a sudden change-over of 
German generals to the opposite camp.
For the Germais themselves, membership of N.A.1,0. 
would have little attraction for it would accentuate 
in a brutal fashion the division of Germany by the Iron 
Curtain,
The^neutralisation of Germany is clearly unacceptable 
to all sincere democrats. For truly free elections cannot 
be undertaken by the present régime in Eastern Europe.
The^best conditions under which free elections could bo 
envisaged - Four-Power occupation of Germany - would, in 
fact, be^the worst possible conditions. Neutrality for 
Germany is, therefore, out of the question. It would 
create a i?power vacuum*' in Germany, with the Americans 
departing for San Francisco and the Russians installing 
themselves and Frankfort-on-the-Oder,
Yet the German Socialists are not prepared to 
contribute to Western defence except under the conditions 
of absolute equality. Although they admit that M, Schuman 
has declared himself against all discrimination in the 
European army, they point out that inequality would 
continue in the Council of N,A,T.O, where Germany is 
excluded and where decisions over life and death are taken. 
The German Socialists believe that it is the task of the 
others -to create the conditions under which absolute 
equality for Germany would be secured both in the European 
army and in N.A.ToO,
Finally, it is undeniable that the European army and 
its political control have become the focal point of 
European policy, especially since the Ottawa Conference, 
the Washington Declaration and the clear attitude taken by 
the State Department and General Eisenhower, Our future 
depends to a large extent on the solution of this problem..
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The rapporteur was authorised by the Study Group 
to add some comments of his own to this summary of the 
discussion. His comments, which were presented to the 
Study Group and modified in the light of the discussion, 
are as follows.
Despite many divergences 
for Socialists exists ; it is 
five points %
of opinion a common basis 
outlined in the following
As Socialists we do not consider historical 
frontiers and divergences between peoples and 
races as immutable.
On the other hand, we neither seek to refute 
nor to level out these differences.
We believe that there exists a public European 
interest which should be defended against 
capitalist and nationalist influences.
To us the idea of public European services 
mentioned in the resolution adopted by the 
Erankfort Congress in July 1951) under a co­
ordinating political direction and subject to 
Parliamentary control (specialised authorities) 
seems to be fruitful.
We do not subscribe to the idea of an autarchic 
Europe ; on the contrary, we desire a Europe 
open to manifold contacts with the rest of the 
world and especially the United States (thus, 
we welcomed the recent conference of European 
and American representatives at Strasbourg) ; 
one of the definite gains of the past year has 
been the growing emphasis on this open character 
of the European community which, indeed, may 
save it from, asphyxia.
It is possible for Socialists to exert an influence 
in the direction of Socialism, by pressing for these last 
points in connection with all the great international 
*'Plans'* (such as the Schuman Plan) which provide for a 
real authority to ensure their practical realisation.
The result of the discussions on the Schuman Plan 
held among Socialist representatives of the Schuman PI 
countries leaves no doubt whatsoever on the fact that 
there is nothing in this Plan to prevent the 
of the iron and coal industries - quite the contrary.
Thus we should have the courage to utilise the possibilities 
offered us in this field.
• -I • , •socialisation
If a certain economic and social development is
present social and technical conditions
•  ^  A  . «  ^
desirable
speak in its favour, if modernisation and greater 
efficiency can be expected from it, if it helps to break 
down frontiers, if it increases the 
public European interests prevail -
conditions we cannot afford to hold __ _ _____  m
because those who carry out this necessary evolution happen 
to be Christian Democrats like Schuman. Adenauer or de Gaso
chance to make the 
given all these 
back our support merely
After all, it is not the first time that Socialist 
measures have been introduced without, or even against, 
the intention of those who had initiated them. Would it 
then not be more radical, more courageous, more Socialist, 
to favour developments that may promote e measure of 
Socialism, through international societies ; full employment 
low tariffs ; the plan for an agricultural community ?
The Socialist International should realise the 
importance, from the Socialist viewpoint, of the 
organisation, and effective control of the various organs 
necessitated by these Plans.
We are concerned, in this supra-State sphere, with
0  - L  X  /
the realisation of social democratic purposes of equal 
importance to those we pursue in the sphere of the 
modern State. We might even say that in the new inter­
national field there are bigger possibilities for us, 
though admittedly also bigger dangers.
The problems demanding the most thorough study by 
the Socialist International are s
a) The "institutional approach", i.e. the view 
that experience has taught the necessity of 
creating organs to precede the definition of 
their functions ;
b) The degree of independence assigned to these 
organs as regards their administrative and 
executive functions ;
c) The control exercised by the executive powers 
of the participating States 5
d) Parliamentary control exercised by a common 
assembly created for each specialised organism, 
as well as the incorporation of these assemblies 
in the Assembly of the Council of Europe ;
e) Long-term plans for these organisms to be 
embodied in treaties ;
f) Plans for a transitory period of considerable 
length and flexibility (as in the case of the 
Schuman Plan), which are particularly needed 
for the common defence Plan.
It must again be stressed, however, that the most 
urgent problem is that of a European defence community 
which would bring in Germany, strengthen the links between 
the six Continental countries, while at the same time 
establishing close links between the six Powers and Britain.
Admittedly, a number of Continental politicians do 
not want these links and rather favour separation or an 
estrangement between Britain and the Continent. But they 
do not exist in the ranks of German, French or, for that 
matter, any other Socialists. International Socialist 
conferences have repeatedly stated and emphasised the fact 
that a free Europe without Britain and Scandinavia is 
unthinkable.
How can we achieve such a free Europe ? Perhaps 
we must combine two different approaches, one that suits 
the six Continental powers, and the other Britain. The 
six Powers could form, a supra-national community for 
defence - on lines parallel with those of the Coal and 
Steel Community - and also include a concrete, firm and 
durable agreement with Britain, on particular subjects 
of common concern. Never has Britain so far refused on 
principle to consider the possibility of a bi-lateral 
agreement.
In pursuing these two methods,, a twofold advantage 
could be reaped. The French and German Socialists could 
accept the Continental community proposed by the Washington 
Declaration, because it would not isolate them from.
Britain but on the contrary create close links with her.
The British, on their part, could also agree to this 
collaboration - in fact said so in the 'Washington 
Declaration - because its form, is acceptable to them.
Finally, there, is “»need to emphasise the fact that 
certain modifications of N.A.T.O. might become necessary 
if the Pact of the Six end the Anglo-Continental agree­
ment on European defence were realised.
At present, every country is affiliated to N.A.T.O. 
individually. In future, there would be one collective 
membership of the six Powers who would speak with one 
voice in N.A.f.O., and - it is fair to assume - with 
greater force. What is, perhaps, most important, Germany 
would have precisely the same chances to express her will 
as the five other partners. There would be no discrimina­
tion at all, because all would have the same rights in 
both the European army and N.A.ToO. This organisation 
would provide the only chance of establishing the 
conditions under which the Continental Socialists of 
the six countries, as well as the British Socialists, would 
find it possible to agree to a common European defence.
The following theses, formulated by the rapporteur, 
might serve as a guiding line for the discussion in the 
Socialist International s
1. The far-reaching changes in the European situation 
(relations with Germany, the Schuman Plan, European
defence, the German problem) make it necessary for a permv 
anent Group of the Socialist International to study carefully 
and continuously these problems. This Group should be 
authorised to deal with all relevant problems and to 
report periodically to the International.
2. The resolution on European Unity, adopted by the Frankfort 
Congress, constitutes a point of departure which was
unanimously accepted and in which the idea of “public 
European services“ controlled by European parliamentarians 
is a positive Socialist element»
3. The Socialist principles exclude any conception of a 
'‘closed“ European community ; it must be open to
contact with the rest of the world and it must also shoulder 
its social responsibilities towards the under-developed ~ 
areas of the world.
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4-. The first task of European Socialists, however, lies 
in their own field, and this is the most difficult 
task because it demands a break with certain traditions.
It demands support for plans which "internationalise" the 
living conditions of the workers ; the two dangers 
confronting us on this way are attentisn on the ore hand, 
utopism on the other.
5* The development of the Western society of the past 
century will be followed by a development in the East 
which is already on the march, which means that for a long 
tine Russia will remain without equilibrium, aggressive and 
dangerous. This danger can be met by the West only if it 
changes and modernises itself continuously.
6 . In order to support this development towards Socialism, 
we must accept the political value of the specialised
authorities envisaged such as the Schuman Plan and the Plan 
for Agriculture, the latter initiated by real peasants who 
go out from their farming practice.
7. These institutional plans are based, and rightly so, on 
principles that are valid for a long period, on a fairly
long transitory period, on executive organs not directly 
dependent on each participating country, and on a combined 
parliamentary control.
* • i
8 . Another factor of present realities - and one that is 
painful to Socialists - is the impatience of the Americans
and the risk of an eventual disappointment on their part 
that night have fatal consequences.
9. Europe cannot surmount these dangers except by rejecting 
once and for all isolation - as she did, in fact, indicate
by the American-European conversations at Strasbourg - and by 
proclaiming herself a partner in the Atlantic community.
10. The touchstone of this nopeni! policy would be the realisa­
tion of a defence union of Western Europe, in which Germany
would co-operate as an equal partner, with all the consequences 
this implies.
11. In order to resolve > within a European defence community, 
the difficulty of contrasting policies, to the effect
that for some the advance towards a Continental federation 
and for others Britain’s collaboration is the condition 
sine qua non, we must envisage a Confederation of two equal 
partners s Britain supported by the Commonwealth on the 
one hand, and the whole of the interested Continentals on 
the other.
12. In the realisation of this s^rnthesis the Socialist 
International, carried by the confidence of all
European and extra-European Socialist parties, could play 
a leading part.
x
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WORLD PLAN FOE MUTUAL AID
Morgan Phillips
Secretary of the British Labour Party and 
Chairman of the Socialist International
In the years between the wars we Socialists were 
deeply moved by our experience of poverty and unemployment. 
We saw around us the wicked waste of material resources - 
factories closed, machinery rusting, ships laid up, 
farms neglected - whole communities desolated - and our 
reason revolted against the inefficiency of a system 
which allowed such things to be. We saw our peoples 
condemned to idleness. Men and women able and eager 
to work left idle in grim poverty, their hopes destroyed 
and their spirits broken. We saw men, driven by despair, 
clutch at false hopes and turn from reason and respons­
ibility in politics to follow the dictators.
The poverty we knew in the period of the Great 
Depression was caused by a break down in the economic 
system. We had the capital equipment and the skill of 
our people, and given adequate planning and the application 
of Socialist principles unemployment and poverty could 
have been avoided. It was ‘'poverty in the midst of 
plenty".
Today we have to direct our minds to poverty arising 
from different causes s to the unrelieved poverty which 
afflicts the peoples of Asia, Africa and other parts of 
the world. In these under-developed regions some two- 
thirds of the world's population eke out a meagre 
existence at the margin of subsistence. Theirs is not 
poverty in the midst of plenty. They do not have great 
industries with technical equipment and skilled manpower 
lying idle. The vast majority of their peoples are 
peasant farmers living, as they have always lived, in 
isolated village communities. They are poor because 
they do not have the technical skills or the productive 
machinery with which to utilise the resources of the 
lands on which they live. And their poverty grows worse 
because of the pressure of increasing population on 
the available resources.
The problem of relieving poverty in the under­
developed territories is NOT that of planning to maintain 
in full employment a skilled labour force and capital 
equipment which already exist. It is that of laying the 
very foundations of modern economic and social systems.
The contrast in vital statistics between the developed 
and the under-developed countries of the world gives some 
indication of the immensity of task which will have to be 
undertaken if the conditions of the depressed millions 
are to be improved.
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Take, for example, the expectation of life. In 
the developed, countries which account for about one 
fifth of the world’s population 92 of each 100 children 
born reach the age of 1 5 , and 70 of each 100 reach the 
age of 60 and contribute 40 years of productive adult 
life to their own and to the national income of their 
countries. In the under-developed territories, having 
some two-thirds of the world’s population, and on which 
the average annual income per head of population is less 
than £ 50, only 54 of each 100 children reach the age 
of 15 years. A large part of the low national income 
is therefore used to rear children who never reach 
productive years. Only 15 per cent, of the children 
reach the age of 60.
Or take food consumption. To sustain life a man 
needs 1,800 calories each day. The average consumption 
in the developed territories is over 3?000 - almost 
twice the minimum, whereas in the under-developed 
territories the average consumption is about 2,000 
calories. In India it is 1,570. Millions of people 
are, in fact, below the minimum necessary to maintain 
active life.
Productivity and human well being in a society 
depend very much on the general level of education.
Only 5 par cent, of the population of developed 
countries are illiterate. 78 per cent, of those in 
under-developed territories are illiterate. This adds 
to the difficulty of spreading new ideas which would 
help increase productivity.
The workers in the developed territories have 
thirty times as much help from machinery as the workers 
in the under-developed territories. The tuberculosis 
death rate, which is a guide to living conditions, is 
333 per hundred thousand in the under-developed 
territories compared with 64 in the economically 
advanced countries.
These glaring contrasts are a challenge to 
Socialists. We have always reacted strongly against 
economic inequalities within our own countries. We 
have recognised that there can be no political stability 
in a society in which classes are sharply divided. We 
must recognise now that a world divided between rich . . 
nations and poor is a world in danger.
The peoples in the under-developed areas have been 
stirred in recent years by a growing awareness of the 
possibilities of human advancement. They are seeking 
a fuller life and striving to realise their full 
capabilities. They aspire towards a higher standard of 
living and better health and physical well being. If 
they are left unable to fulfil their reasonable aspirations, 
their misery will make them fertile ground for any 
ideology which will hold out to them promise, however 
false, of means towards a better life.
It is of vital importance to us that the vast 
economic and social changes which are necessary to create
tolerable living conditions for the depressed millions 
should be undertaken in co-operation with the Industrial 
nations of the free world in an expanding international 
economy which will benefit all peoples and which will 
keep the way open for the evolution of free democratic 
institutions*
#
These changes will not take place smoothly without 
assistance from, the developed countries, European 
Socialists must take on the task of stimulating in 
their own country a public opinion in favour of providing 
the necessary assistance and a willingness to undertake 
the short-term sacrifices which such aid would involve.
Economic assistance for the development of the 
under-developed territories by itself is not enough. 
Socialists must support development programmes in a 
spirit of genuine concern for the well being of the 
peoples in backward countries. For centuries these 
lands were regarded merely as sources of raw materials 
and as markets for the manufactures of the industrial 
countries,
They were developed, where they were developed at 
all, to serve the interests of the industrial nations. 
Unbearable attitudes of superiority towards less 
fortunate peoples were created and still have to be 
fully eradicated. Many of them are still dependent 
territories and need not only economic development but 
political advancement.
The assistance of the industrial nations must now 
be offered in a spirit of equality. We must seek to 
build up a wholly new relationship based on mutual 
respect and co-operation to meet our common economic 
needs.
xxxx
The development of the under-developed territories 
is an immense task and not one which can quickly be 
accomplished. The preliminary report of the Seventh 
Conference of Economic Experts of the Socialist 
International which was circulated recently deals with 
some of the problems involved. It shows that the under­
developed. territories require capital Investment for 
three major purposes.
First they require investment to raise the level of 
health and education and to improve administrative 
techniques of their Governments. They need schools, 
technical colleges and vocational training centres.
They need hospitals, dispensaries and improved housing. 
Investment is necessary, too, in scientific research and 
to provide the statistical and other services without 
which planned development cannot take place. Investment 
of this kind will earn no direct revenue and will have 
to be met either from the general revenues of the countries 
concerned or from, external assistance in the form of grants
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Secondly, they require investment in basic equip­
ment - for transport and communications, to develop 
electric power, for irrigation schemes, for soil 
conservation and a multitude of similar purposes. Quite 
often thy return on such investment would be sufficient 
not only to cover running costs but to amortise the 
initial outlay. It is the easiest type of investment 
to finance by means of loans, but long amortisation 
periods and low interest rates are necessary.
Thirdly, there is needed investment in the productive 
sector t in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, in 
mineral resources and in new industries. In these fields 
both public and private investment will be necessary.
The rate of capital accumulation in the under­
developed territories is quite insufficient to support 
rapid economic development, and international investment 
on the old imperialist basis cannot be revived. New 
techniques for making grants-in-aid available and for 
stimulating the flow of international lending will have 
to be worked out.
The new pattern of international lending which has 
been emerging since the war can possibly be developed.
The private investor lends to his government or to an 
international agency such as the International Bank which 
in turn lends to the government of the capital importing 
country. This government either invests the money itself 
in public services or nationalised undertakings or may re­
lend to farmers, to manufacturers or other private 
entrepreneurs. This would seem to bo the nly way in which 
capital can be obtained to increase the yield of peasant 
agriculture. The private investor cannot lend money 
directly to small farmers in distant countries.
We have to recognise that there will be serious 
limitations on the rate at which under-developed territories 
can absorb capital, even when capital can be made available 
by the developed countries. They need a great Increase in 
competent administrators, of managerial staffs and of 
technicians at all levels. The training of local personnel 
in sufficient numbers will take many years and the 
technical assistance which can be made available in the 
meantime by the developed countries can only meet the 
most urgent needs of a few countries.
Moreover, as the Report emphasises, a programme of 
development will require many fundamental social changes.
In the peasant economies of Asia, for example, land reform 
is one of the most urgent problems. In some countries 
the whole agrarian structure nay have to be modified.
At present economic development is impeded by land tenure 
systems, by the uneconomic size of farms ; the maldistribu­
tion of land ownership ; the fragmentation of holdings ; 
by indebtedness and lack of adequate credit facilities.
It has to be remembered too that many of the peoples 
in the under-developed territories, especially in Africa, 
live in primitive tribal communities and have an attitude 
of resignation towards poverty. Here the need is for
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"community development" - for mss education schemes to 
stimulate the desire for social progress and economic 
betterment.
The raising of living standards in the under-developed 
territories will take time, but it is nevertheless an 
urgent task. A beginning has been made in the assistance 
given by^the metropolitan countries to their dependent 
territories, by the Technical Assistance Programmes of 
the United Nations, by the International Bank, by Truman’s 
Fourth Point Programme and by the Colombo Plan. More is 
necessary. Socialists should work towards a "World Plan 
for Mutual Aid" which will meet the material needs of 
peoples all over the world.
The Conference of Experts has made a first review 
of the problems for the Socialist International. Its 
detailed report will be available soon. This preparatory 
work should be carried on and co-operation should be 
sought from Socialists in the under-developed territories 
in drafting a statement of Socialist policy on the subject.
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